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THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, founded in 1912 as the voice of black 
South Africans, was banned by law on 30 March 1960, nine· days after the 
infamous Sharpeville massacre and at a time of unprecedented international 
pressure directed at the racial policies of the government of South Africa. 
The ANC remained illegal until2 February 1990, when President De Klerk 
unharmed it, together with other illegal organizations such as the Pan 
Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party, as a bold step 
in his declared aim of creating a new South Africa through negotiation. 
We may therefore define the ANC's period in exile as lasting from 1960 to 
1990. For most of that period the ANC leadership was based abroad as 
were many of its most active rank and file members. It is no exaggeration to 
say that the ANC was in danger of extinction inside South Africa at one 
point, say from the arrest of the Umkhonto we Sizwe leadership at Rivonia in 
July 1963 until after the Soweto rising of 1976. For most of that time the 
ANC was committed to advancing its aims by force of arms through the 
autonomous organization which later became its military wing, Umkhonto 
we Sizwe. It was these conditions which formed the ANC during its exile 
period. 
Before giving a brief account of the main developments which affected the 
ANC during these years, it is perhaps helpful to sketch the previous history 
of the organization. At its foundation in 1912, the ANC was a rather 
genteel organization, established by what were then the pillars of black 
South African society. These included lawyers and ministers of religion 
with some Western education as well as traditional chiefs. Its tactics 
were to lobby and petition on behalf of black people. It was not a mass 
organization, made no attempt to apply pressure by such tactics as strikes or 
demonstrations, and appears. to have engaged in little formal activity beyond 
its annual general meetings. It did not represent the views of white, Indian 
or so-called 'coloured' South Mricans, nor was membership open to them. 
It had no ideology beyond a moderate nationalism. 
The ANC first developed a relationship with the Communist Party of 
South Africa in the 1920s. The CPSA was founded in 1921 by white 
immigrant socialists, many of them of British origin such as Sidney Bunting, 
the Communist Party General Secretary, Bill Andrews and David Ivon 
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Jones. At its inception the Communist Party regarded the white prolet-
ariat of the Witwatersrand as being the obvious breeding ground for socialist 
politics. The black urban work force was largely composed of migrant 
workers who did not appear to be ripe for advanced socialism, although it 
is fair to say that some of the early Communists, and especially Sidney 
Bunting, were more than usually sympathetic to the cause of black workers. 
Nevertheless, in pursuit of its identification of the white proletariat as the 
key component of the struggle, the Party in 1922 got off to a disastrous start 
by backing a strike of white workers on the Rand, in which the workers' main 
grievance was the threat posed to their standard of living by cheap black 
labour. The strike was a disaster because it was repressed with great 
savagery by the government, with dozens of lives lost, and because it resulted 
in legislation formally defining black and white jobs. 
It was in the aftermath of this strike that the Communist Party of South 
Africa, realizing that the mass of white workers could be lost to class politics 
because ofthe racial factor, made its first efforts to explore links with black 
organizations, including the ANC. The relationship was consummated in 
1928 when Josiah Gumede (the father of the later United Democratic Front 
leader Archie Gumede), a fervent admirer of communism who had visited 
Moscow, became the ANC President and urged the two organizations to 
work together. On the Communist side, this trend was subject to the direc-
tion of the Co min tern, which in 1928 gave orders to the Communist Party of 
South Africa, to the dismay of many white comrades, to work with black 
organizations such as the ANC for the attainment of an 'independent native 
republic'. 
In other words, we can say that 1928 was a landmark in South Mrican 
radical history for several reasons. First, it marked the assumption by the 
Communist Party of a theory of two-stage revolution which it has held ever 
since. Since 1928, South African Communists have believed that it is their 
duty to work in the first instance for majority rule in South Africa and 
only when that has been achieved to aim to achieve the second stage of the 
revolution, the socialist stage. 
This has made the ANC and the Communist Party natural allies, since 
both have the same aim in the medium term. It was in this period after 1928 
that an AN C-Communist Party alliance was born and nurtured through the 
work of people like Josiah Gumede and Moses Kotane, the fiery Communist 
who studied in Moscow in the early 1930s, was General Secretary of the 
Communist Party from 1939 to 1978, and was always a staunch member of 
the ANC, being eventually its Treasurer-General. Since 1928 and even 
before the Communist Party has been determinedly . non-racial in its 
membership policy, an important tradition. The relationship was not a 
smooth one in the early days, especially during the 1930s when Gumede 
was removed from the presidency of the ANC by a conservative and 
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anti-communist backlash and when the Party itself was torn apart by 
internal squabbles fuelled by personality clashes and changes of line 
emanating from the Comintern in Moscow. 
Only in the 1940s, and especially after the Soviet Union's entry into the 
Second World War in 1941 had created an official climate of tolerance by the 
South African goverpment towards the Communist Party, did the Party-
ANC alliance revive. This was one of the points taken up by the band of 
young black radicals who constituted the ANC Youth League in 1944 and 
who were to play such an important part in South Mrican history. Anton 
Lembede (who died tragically young), Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, 
Walter Sisulu, Robert Sobukwe and others campaigned to transform the 
ANC from the small and somewhat toothless organization it had previously 
been into a more militant organization. In their early days all of these 
young lions were more or less anti-communist, fearing that the highly dis-
ciplined and thoroughly Stalinist Communist Party might impose its own 
agenda on the ANC through people like Kotane, J. B. Marks and Edwin 
Mofutsanyana, who were members of both organizations. Competition 
between the Communists and the Youth Leaguers reached a peak in the 
ANC's 1949 elections when Walter Sisulu was elected to the Secretary-
General's position of the ANC by a mere six votes over the Communist Party 
candidate Dan Tloome. The political climate was governed by the 1948 
electoral victory of the National Party, which had made clear its intent to ban 
the Communist Party. This sent black Communists scurrying for cover 
inside the ANC. So when the Communist Party of South Africa was duly 
banned, and voted to disband itself in 1950, it had at least two important 
side-effects. One was to cause black Communists such as Dan Tloome, 
Moses Kotane and J. B. Marks to continue their political work in their 
capacity as ANC members. The other was to disarm the anti-communism 
of some of the ANC Youth League, including Mandela, Sisulu and Tambo, 
who were prepared to dilute their earlier anti-communist sentiments in 
order to accommodate an ally. 
Meanwhile, non-black Communists reconstituted themselves into other 
organizations such as the Indian Congresses and the Congress ofDemocrats, 
the latter effectively-a front organization for the Communist Party, secretly 
re-established in 1953 as the South African Communist Party. Already 
some ANC members feared that the formation of the Congress Alliance 
between the ANC, the Congress of Democrats, the Indian Congresses and 
allied organizations was changing the direction of the ANC. This was one 
of the factors giving rise to the breakaway in 1959 of the Pan Africanist 
Congress, which rejected the Communist alliance partly on the grounds that 
the Communist tail was wagging the ANC dog. 
· It has been necessary to sketch this briefhistory to illustrate several points 
crucial for understanding the evolution of the ANC after it was driven 
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underground and into exile in 1960. I would draw especial attention to the 
following: 
1. The ANC and the Communist Party had a long, if not always 
harmonious, history of association. 
2. The Communist Party, by 1960, already had 10 years' experience of 
clandestine work which was to prove invaluable in the re-establishment of 
the AN C in exile. 
3. Some members of the ANC, an exclusively black organization, had at 
times grown wary of the Communist Party, not least because of the number 
of whites, 'Coloureds' or Indians in its leadership and the fear that these 
would unduly influence the direction of the premier vehicle for black 
political expression. 
4. The Communist Party had better international contacts than the ANC, 
largely through its connection with the Comintern and its successors. 
5. The Communist Party also had more experience of mass mobilization, 
which it lent to the ANC when it undertook the defiance campaigns and 
various mass protests of the 1950s. 
In fact the ANC was singularly unprepared for its banning in March 
1960. Only two days before the measure, ANC National Executive mem-
ber and former Secretary-General Oliver Tambo was directed to leave the 
country to set up an ANC external mission to lobby for outside support. It 
was this which was to eventually make Tambo the senior ANC leader in 
exile. 
After the ANC's banning, many ANC members and many Communists 
determined to continue the struggle by the only means left to them, namely 
through illegality and force of arms. The result was the formation in 
mid-1961 of Umkhonto we Sizwe. It is important to note that MK, as it is 
known, was not set up by order of the ANC National Executive. Rather, 
it was considered an autonomous organization established by members of 
both the ANC and the SACP. The MK leadership, under the overall 
command of Nelson Mandela, the former President of the ANC's Transvaal 
branch, was drawn from members of both organizations. This was to 
prove important in bringing the ANC and the Party closer together. 
The flight into clandestinity made the ANC far more dependent than 
previously on the Party. For one thing, the Communist Party had the best 
connections with the two major revolutionary powers in the world at that 
time, the USSR and China. And during the period of the Sino-Soviet 
split, around 1964, the Party used its influence to shepherd the ANC away· 
from the path of Maoism and heresy to the point that Maoist literature 
was withdrawn from the training camps which Umkhonto we Sizwe was 
establishing in Tanzania and elsewhere and military trainees were with-
drawn from Chinese military academies. It led the ANC to side with the 
other pro-Moscow liberation movements in southern Africa, such as the 
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Zimbabwe Mrican People's Union of Joshua Nkomo, and to regard with 
some hostility the Chinese-influenced movements such as Robert Mugabe's 
Zimbabwe African National Union and the government of Tanzania. The 
effects of this lasted into the 1980s. 
On both the political and military fronts the ANC was almost wiped out 
inside South Africa in the early 1960s. Nelson Mandela was arrested in 
1962 and the cream of its leadership, including Walter Sisulu and others, in a 
police raid on Lilliesleaffarm in Rivonia, in 1963. The ANC underground 
inside South Africa was smashed, and thousands of ANC members or 
sympathizers were detained, kept under police surveillance, harassed, 
banned and otherwise neutralized. 
Thus the ANC after 1963 was huddled in exile in Tanzania, its main 
leaders gone, only Tambo being considered paramount by virtue of having 
been designated three years earlier as leader of the ANC External Mission. 
The Communist Party, on the other hand, was better equipped for .the life of 
exile. Although it lost such prominent members as Govan Mbeki, Ahmed 
Kathrada and Bram Fischer, leaders of the calibre of Yusuf Dadoo, Joe 
Slovo, Moses Mabhida and Moses Kotane were in exile and were able to 
reconstitute the Central Committee. · The· Communists were the people 
with access to guns and money, they had a more coherent organization 
. than the ANC, and they alone had a long-term strategy, formulated in 
their programme 'The Road to South African Freedom', adopted by the 
Party in 1962. The Communists were the people with the international 
connections, thanks to their standing in Moscow. And, in the person of 
Joe Slovo, they had MK's most sophisticated military brain. 
Already one of the recurring problems of the ANC in exile was making 
itself manifest. The MK camps in Tanzania were full of young men and 
women committed to armed struggle but bored and frustrated. There were 
signs of disaffection as early as 1966. . Much of the feeling was directed 
against Joe Modise, a former street-fighter from Alexandra who had been a 
security guard .for Mandela and Tambo during their public meetings and 
who had graduated to become the commander of the ANC army. He was 
allied to several other former township hard men who later became 
prominent in the ANC leadership some of whom even rose in the ranks of the 
normally ultra-intellectual Communist Party. 
Current mythology has it that disaffected soldiers found a leader in the 
person of Chris Hani, the son of a humble migrant worker from the Transkei 
who had managed to receive an education, had come under the influence 
of Cape Town Communists such as Jack and Ray Simons and Simon 
Makana, and had gone into exile to join the army. He is said to have signed 
a memorandum articulating the soldiers' grievances, for which he was 
sentenced to death by an outraged MK High Command. He was saved 
only by the intervention of political leaders who decided that the only way to 
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solve this problem of incipient mutiny was to throw thearmy into battle. 
The result was the Wankie campaign of 1967, undertaken in partnership 
with ZAPU. The joint ZAPU/ANC forces surprised the Rhodesian 
security forces by their strength and their firepower, the first time these had 
been fully deployed, but their tactics were hopeless against a vastly more 
mobile and better equipped enemy and brought heavy casualties on both the 
ANC and ZAPU. 
· After the Wankie campaign, a period of demoralization set in which led to 
the calling of a conference at Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969. This was a true 
turning-point in AN C history. The main motives for the conference were: 
to take stock of military strategy in the aftermath ofWankie, to restore the 
confidence of ANC members in their National Executive, and to plot a new 
political strategy. 
The Party saw in the Morogoro conference an opportunity to advance its 
own cause by persuading the ANC to adopt a more explicit socialist line 
and by opening the ranks of its External Mission to non-black members, 
thus strengthening the commitment first outlined in the. 1955 Freedom 
Charter to a class, rather . than a racial, analysis of South Africa's 
condition. The result was a triumph for the Party. The conference was 
packed with Party members, some of whom were not members of the 
ANC. It voted to adopt the document called 'Strategy and Tactics', a 
watered-down version of the Party's own programme. It elected new 
officers. And it decided to open membership ofthe ANC in exile to non-
blacks. The Party came to dominate the ANC's most important adminis-
trative organ, the Revolutionary Council. Headed byCommunist stalwart 
Moses Mabhida, it included a white (Slovo) an Indian (YusufDadoo) and a 
'Coloured' (Reg September), all three of them Party members also. 
Morogoro inspired a period of dissidence in which a faction, later labelled 
the Gang of Eight, emerged as critics of what they alleged was SACP 
manipulation. The eight, all blacks, included the Communists Tennyson 
Makiwane and Temba Mqotha, both of whom had been prominent in the 
Party, and also the son-in-law of the former ANCPresident-General, Chief 
Albert Lutuli. They eventually left the ANC in 1975 but their efforts to set 
up a splinter group failed dismally. The dissidents sank without a trace. 
Tennyson Makiwane was later murdered by an ANC unit in 1980. The 
Morogoro conference and the fate of the Gang of Eight sealed the Party's 
supremacy and the principle of democratic centralism within the ANC, and 
hence destroyed the prospect of real debate on certain fundamental subjects. 
Important though these developments were in the life of the ANC, they 
took place in a vacuum insulated from life inside South Africa. There the 
local initiative passed to the Black Consciousness Movement and the Soweto 
generation. This is not the place to describe the June 1976 rising in 
Soweto, and the momentous effect it had on politics. Suffice it to say that 
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thousands of young South Africans, very angry and very militant, left South 
Africa to seek arms abroad. Many had never heard of either the ANC or the 
PAC, although their Black Consciousness beliefs made them closer to the 
PAC than to the ANC. By dint of much hard work and the shortcomings of 
the PAC, the ANC succeeded in recruiting most of the Soweto emigres to its 
armed wing and installing them in the military training camps now springing 
up in newly independent Angola. 
The task facing the ANC was to convert these Black Consciousness 
radicals into loyal ANC cadres, and this it did through a system of political 
education carried out by Party commissars especially at Nova Katenga 
Camp in Angola, before it was destroyed by the South African Air Force. 
The successful early commissars at Katenga were Francis Meli, Mark Shope 
and Jack Simons. From Katenga, the system of commissars spread 
throughout the ANC, ev.entually leading to considerable resentment, 
especially under the regime of Andrew Masondo as National Commissar. 
The Soweto recruits enabled MK to relaunch the armed struggle for the 
first time since Rivonia. Under the influence of Vietnam's legendary 
General Giap, whom Slovo and others visited for a period of study, ANC 
strategy was to build a programme of armed propaganda, especially through 
the Special Operations Unit which carried out the well-known attacks 
on the oil from coal plant at Sasolberg and on Military Headquarters at 
Voortrekkerhoogte. 
Pretoria's response was the intensified campaign of destabilization, 
murder, cross.; border raids and abductions which began in earnest after the 
inauguration of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency in 1981, and which was 
eventually to succeed in its aim of defeating MK's guerrilla war. 
One of the main consequences of destabilization and the disruption of 
MK's logistics network was to keep the MK soldiers bottled up in their 
Angolan camps. Here, short of supplies, bored and frustrated, disen-
chanted by the corruption of some of their commanders and the brutality 
of the camp regime, the soldiers' mood became dangerous. The High 
Command, in mid-1983, set them to fighting against UNIT A. But this did 
little more than add to their grievances. In early 1984 a mutiny erupted at 
the battle front, and hundreds of MK soldiers headed for Luanda to lobby 
their High Command, calling for the· resignation of the entire leadership 
except for Tambo, Slovo, Moses Mabhida and Chris Hani, and labelling all 
the rest as spies of Pretoria and imperialist agents. They reserved their 
special hatred for Army Commander Joe Modise, the target of particular 
hatred by the soldiers for nearly a quarter of a century. 
The mutineers under aCommittee ofTen chaired byZaba Nkondo, were 
persuaded to surrender. The ringleaders were detained and others sent 
for re-education at a punishment camp in northern Angola. There they 
mutinied once more. This time there were pitched battles between loyalist 
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troops and mutineers. After the loyalists had retaken Pango camp, the 
ring-leaders were executed in public and others were detained, some until 
very recently. It was from the period after the mutiny that the worst 
violations of human rights within the ANC date, recently reported in the 
press. 
The disaster of the Angola mutiny came at the same time as events inside 
South Africa gave the ANC its greatest hope yet of a military breakthrough 
which it was ill equipped to exploit. This came in the shape of the Vaal 
triangle uprising of 1984, which soon spread throughout South Africa and 
was only snuffed out by the government's imposition of a state of emergency 
in 1986. The explosion of black South Africa seemed to offer suitable 
conditions for guerrilla war and takeover. 
At the height of this promising period, the ANC convened its first 
conference since Morogoro in 1969. This was the Kabwe Consultative 
Conference of 1985, the main event of which was a successful proposal by 
the Party for the first time to remove all racial barriers to membership of 
the ANC's governing body, the National Executive Committee. The first 
white to be elected was Joe Slovo, who became Party General Secretary on 
Moses Mabhida's death the following year. 
In retrospect, the ANC's confidence in its eventual military triumph at 
the time of Kabwe, around the mid-1980s, was misplaced. It failed to 
appreciate the full strength of the Pretoria government; it failed to resolve 
the practical problems and lethal political intrigues which made the ANC's 
guerrilla struggle so much less effective than it might have been; and, 
naturally enough, it failed to predict the end of the Cold War with its 
incalculable consequences. 
Nevertheless one powerful ANC and Communist Party leader at least was 
working steadily to improve the ANC's range of political contacts and to 
cultivate the political terrain. This was the then information chief and 
confidant of Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki. In time many others in the 
AN C and the Party were to be glad of the course he had mapped out virtually 
single-handed in the early 1980s. It was largely throughMbeki;and with . 
backing from Sweden and support from President Oliver Tambo, that the 
1988 proposals for a Post-Apartheid South Africa, together with consti- . 
tutional and economic policy guidelines, were published as ANC discussion 
documents. 
The late 1980s made plain the developments in the ANC during the exile 
period. The relationship between the ANC and the Party had .changed to 
the point that there ceased to be an alliance in the normal sense of the term. 
The Party did not bring its own members to the Alliance. Instead, vir-
tually all Party members were now members of the ANC too. Moreover 
they dominated the ANC leadership to the extent that, by late 1989, of some 
35 members of the NEC only eight were not Party members. The Party 
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dominated every leading organ of the ANC, and used the organization as a 
pool from which to recruit the best and brightest for party membership. 
Corresponding to this, the ANC's tradition as an umbrella movement, 
covering all individuals of nationalist persuasion, had been altered. The 
1j\N Chad been transformed into a socialist organization in which criticism of 
socialism, or even of its Stalinist variant, was not welcome~ Moreover, the 
practice of democratic centralism had installed in power an elite which 
switched between major command posts and which did not tolerate criticism 
of its decisions. The movement was effectively split into a number of 
bureaucratic fiefdoms, headed by barons who rivalled one another for 
control over turf. Despite the deadliness of these intrigues, any inter-
vention threatening the interests of any one of the barons inspired all to close 
ranks. · This has made the leadership very unpopular with the MK rank and 
file, as was made clear when the rank and file expressed themselves freely 
to Walter Sisulu when he visited Lusaka in January 1990. They now put 
all their faith in the Rivonia generation to return the movement to its 
democratic tradition. 
The return from exile obliges the leaders of the ANC to show their true 
credentials to their real constituency, which is the people of South Africa. 
In the meantime, decision-"making is paralyzed and much foot-dragging 
is going on. Only time will tell what the ANC will become once it has 
returned home fully and once the people of South Africa have had time to 
give their considered opinion of it. But in the meantime, we may be able to 
detect already a number of reactions or trends resulting from the period in 
exile and the subsequent homecoming. 
In the first place, the ANC can rest assured that it is the prime vehicle for 
black South Africans and the principal opposition party in the country. 
And, whatever the shortcomings of the armed struggle, it has had a mighty 
impact on radical youth, who have seen the ANC.:.Communist Party Alliance 
as the one force which really dared to fight apartheid in the way that so many 
aspired to do. 
Whether the Communist Party and the ANC will remain in alliance or will 
go their separate ways must remain an open question. At present, the Party 
shows every sign of being embarrassed by the very success of its 40-year 
policy of entryism. But whatever happens, the Party can be credited (if 
credit is appropriate) with turning the ANC into a multi-racial organization. 
It is unlikely that it will ever become a solely black outfit again: rather we are 
seeing whether the AN C can pick up the threads ofits pre-exile tradition as a 
broad democratic party rather than a Marxist-Leninist organization. 
